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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented to the Court for
review:
1.

Whether a heart attack which was precipitated by

the attorney applicant's stressful activities is a compensable
injury under Utah's Workman's Compensation Act.
2.

Whether the Judge erred in requiring "unusual

stress" in applicant's work activities in order to recover
benefits•
3.

Whether the Judge viewed the facts in the light

most favorable to the applicant, as required by law.
4.

Whether there was sufficient evidence to justify

a finding that an accident occurred after viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the applicant.
5.

Whether there was sufficient conflicting medical

evidence to justify submitting the matter to a medical panel
after viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the
applicant.
6.

Whether there was, in fact, sufficient evidence

to enter an order in favor of the applicant, finding that there
was an accident and that the medical evidence did, in fact,
support a finding that the applicant suffered a heart attack
during the course of his employment which aggravated a preexisting condition for which he should receive benefits
pursuant to the Worker's Compensation laws of Utah.
- 2 -

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Statutes, cases, and authorities believed to be
determinative of the respective issues raised include:
A.

Section 35-1-45 Utah Code Annotated:

Employee

can recover benefits "who is injured, by accident arising out
of or during the course of employment."
Section 35-1-77 Utah Code Annotated:

Duty of

Commission to refer case to medical panel.
B.

Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 22 Utah P.2d

368, where Judge Elton died of a stroke, in which the Court held
that an aggravation of a pre-existing disease is compensable and
that an internal failure brought about by exertion in the course
of employment may be an accident following Powers v. Industrial
Commission, 427 P.2d 740 (UT. 1967).
The case of Nazum v. Roosendahl Construction, Utah,
1977, 565 P.2d 1144, where the court held only slight physical
exertion is required when an employee suffered a heart attack;
Purity Biscuit Company v. Industrial Commission, UT 1949, 201
P.2d 961, in which the court required only usual exertion when a
truck driver was awarded benefits when his employment aggravated
and contributed to a spine disease; Dee Hospital v. Industrial
Commission, 138 P,2d 233; United States Steel Corporation v.
Draper, Utah, Utah 1980, 613 P.2d 508; Painter Motor Company v.
Ostler, Utah 1980, 617 P.2d 975; Price River Coal v. Industrial
Commission, UT 1986, 49 Utah Adv. Rep. 27; Robertson v.
- 3 -

Industrial Commission, 163 P.2d 331; Larson on Workers
Compensation, Desk Edition, Volume 1, Section 38-40, 38*80, 38.8J
(b); Little v. J. Corber, New Mexico 1963, 378 P. 2d 119, showing
the recent trend where an employee became emotionally upset
because of his manager's criticism and suffered and died of a
myocardial infarction; Archer v. Industrial Commission, Arizona,
1980, 619 P.2d 27, benefits were granted where an employee becann
emotionally upset and died of a myocardial infarction.
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 25 (UT 1986),
The test is not this employee's usual exertion in his employment
but with the exertions of normal non-employment life of this or
any other person.
C.

The overriding principle which governs adjudicatio

of Workers Compensation disability claims is that such claims ar
to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits and that
any doubts from the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the
claimant.

Prows v. Industrial Commission, Utah 1980, 610 P.2d

1362; McPhie v. Industrial Commission, Utah 1977, 567 P.2d 153;
and many others.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This case involves the claim of a hard driving,
intense trial attorney, Robert M. McRae, who is head of his
partnership's Vernal office.

After a week of stressful legal

activities, McRae was stricken with heart attack symptoms
- 4 -

during intense legal practice on Friday, June 28, 1985.

He

continued intense legal activities at his law office in Vernal
on Saturday morning, June 29, 1985, when the symptoms
intensified into a full, severe myocardial infarction.

He had

to be rushed the same day by Air Lifeline for medical care in
Salt Lake City, where his heart stopped beating on two
occasions, but he recovered after emergency triple bypass
surgery.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BY
COMMISSION

A hearing was held January 16, 1987, followed by the
Judge's Order dated June 22, 1987, wherein he denied the
application without referring the matter to a medical panel for
evaluation (R. 390). Despite th-e treating physician's medical
opinion that Mthe emotional stress and tension related to his
occupation are certainly associated with an aggravation to
produce his myocardial infarction1'

(R.P.125), the Industrial

Commission upheld the Administrative Law Judge by its order
denying the Motion for Review dated September 9, 1987. (R. 434)
RELEVANT FACTS
Inasmuch as neither of the parties objected to the
Judge's first two findings of fact, presenting a brief resume
of activities of the appellant, we include those two findings
as follows:
1.
The applicant is a practicing trial
attorney with offices in Vernal, Utah and Salt Lake
City, Utah.
On June 28-29, 1985 the applicant
- 5 -

sustained a severe heart attack during the course
of his employment.
The diary or schedule kept by
his secretary shows that on June 28, 1985, he was
scheduled for depositions in the morning, two
trials in the Circuit Court, and a meeting with a
client in the oil fields. Forty-five minutes after
lunch, he had severe stomach pains prompting him to
go to the Ashley Valley Medical Center.
He had
blood drawn and underwent an EKG and was told a
serum test would be made.
To his knowledge, he
went to the oil field to meet with his client.
Upon his return, he still didn't feel very good.
He had dinner downtown, because his wife was in
Salt Lake City. The hospital explained to him the
reason for the blood serum test.
Apparently they
suspected an ulcer condition.
He decided not to
stay in the hospital, even though he had been asked
to do so. The following morning, June 29, 1985, he
returned to the Ashley Valley Medical Center for a
repeat blood test and another EKG. He then went to
his office, because he was scheduled to be involved
in depositions.
2.
The
applicant
proceeded
with
the
depositions the morning of June 29, 1985, but
around 11:00 a.m. Dr. Norman Nielsen called from
the hospital and informed the applicant he was
having a heart attack and he was to get to the
hospital immediately.
He finished the deposition
in which he was involved and then sent
his
secretary home to get some clothes.
He then drove
three blocks to the hospital.
He was then sent by
lifeline to Salt Lake City, where he was admitted
to the St. Mark's Hospital. He recalls very little
that happened after that for a period of some
fourteen days. He underwent a triple bypass surgery
on July 1, 1985.
He was told that he came, very
close to dying on a couple of occasions.
He was
released from the hospital on July 16, 1985.
He
returned to active practice around August 12, 1985
but on a limited basis, avoiding court appearances,
and has continued to do so to the present time.
The appellant does not contend that his disabling
heart attack was caused by the two-day strenuous activities,
but that the stressful and strenuous activities of those two
days aggravated a pre-existing condition sufficient to bring on- 6 -

the disabling heart attack resulting in a near-death emergency
brought under control only because, fortunately, he was in the
St. Mark's Hospital.

His surgeon, Dr. Parrish, states as

follows (Exhibit D-l, R. 282):
LV studies and run-offs were not done because of
the acute nature of the situation and indeed on the
first injection into the right coronary he went in
to a total asystole, AV block with asystole, and it
was rather difficult to resuscitate him.
He
required some closed chest massage and then went
into ventricular tachycardia situation and required
temporary pacing by the transvenous femoral route.
The appellant disagrees with the subsequent
paragraphs in the Judge's findings of fact.

In paragraph 3 the

Judge erred in finding that there was a long documented history
of prior heart disease, dating back 15 years or so prior to the
incident in question.

The record will clearly show that though

the appellant had some angina and an incident or two of chest
pains over a period of 15 or so years, each time he was checked
there was NO FINDINGS OF HEART DISEASE.

The Judge's

description of the applicant as being a "hard-driving, selfemployed attorney who has been engaged in heavy trial work for
mo're than 25 years'* is true.

(R. 391)

The Judge was further

correct in finding that:
It is difficult to quantify the stress associated
with the applicant's particular practice of law.
It is probably safe to assume that it was a more
stressful
practice than engaged in by
most
attorneys. . . .chronic job stress is considered
by
cardiologists
as
one
of
the
factors
contributing to coronary atheroscerosis. (R. 392)
- 7 -

This is not to say that he was not working under
stressful circumstances.
To the contrary, as
noted previously, the applicant's type and style
of practice could justifiably be characterized as
more stressful than most attorneys'. (R. 393)
The Judge further quoted Dr. F. Clyde Null correctly in his
paragraph 7:
Atheroslcerotic heart disease,
of
course,
is
exacerbated under symptoms of angina pectorus or
made much worse under periods of emotional stress,
pressure and tension. Prolonged hours of activity,
striking degree of physical exertion, exposure to
cold, or marked emotional pressure and tension
frequently result in increase symptoms referable to
the
heart.
Mr.
McRae
has
underlying
atherosclerotic heart disease, and of course, all
of the symptoms of that disorder can be made worse
by
heavy work loads and excessive
emotional
pressure and tension. (R. 392 and 134)
The stressful activities were not delineated by the
Administrative Law Judge because neither he nor the Commission
had access to a transcript.

The stressful conditions, relied or

by the appellant, are as follows:
1.

The appellant is a principle partner in the law

firm of McRae & Deland.

McRae is in charge of the Vernal

office (R. 36), and Deland handles the Salt Lake City office
(R. 45-46)•

Appellant's personal income during 1985 was about

$60,000 (R.37).

He started out alone in the Vernal office,

hired one lawyer in 1981 and hired another lawyer in 1982 becaus
of the rapidly increasing work load.

His Vernal business

continued to expand, but he did not have sufficient office space
and did not desire to expand his office by adding additional
attorneys.

(R. 107)

He found his practice so pressing going
- 8 -

into the summer of 1985 that he had to hire more law students
than usual to do his research.
2.

(R. 73, 106)

In answers to questions the appellant stated,

concerning his activities before June 28 as follows:
A.
Yes.
I had pretty heavy personal
injury
schedule. I had a Ford Motor Products liability case
that Ray Christensen had run me all over on.
He went on to describe that the plaintiff had fallen in a manhole
lid which involved the city in the case, and then another injury
occurred on a rural bridge so that a third defendant was involved
in the already very complicated case and went on to describe
another N-L Industries Case and stated, "I just had a whole ton
of personal injury cases pending."

(R. 52)

In referring to his

heavily scheduled calendar book, it reflected only appointments
made by the secretaries and did not show appointments made by the
attorneys, lots of walk-in business, more study, research or
travel.

(R. 66)

He further described the location of his office

being right across the street from the court house, brought in
lots of walk-in business, particularly criminal cases, and that
he did a lot of D.U.I, cases which were not shown on the
calendar.

(R. 67)

He had 200 D.U.I, cases a year.

(R. Ill)

Q.
Now let's see, I believe you were trying to
summarize a little here, in the week prior to your
heart attack, I think you have talked about several
cases that you have been involved with quite
heavily. One was T.W.T. Is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Was that quite a heavy case?
- 9 -

A.
It was a heavy case, Because they had gone into
Chapter 11 proceedings, and that was a new ball game
for us, for me.
Q. You had had a jury verdict just prior to that, of
how much?
A.

$465,000.

Q.

Then you had a Clayton Case?

A.

Clayton Hatch.

Q.

Yeah.

A.
That is still—I hope it doesn't get appealed to
the Supreme Court, but that was a--it is a nightmare.
Q.
And then you had a Ford Motor Company
case?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Also involved Salt Lake City?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What was that case?

A.

That's

the one I was taking the

liability

deposition

on

when—
Q.

On that Saturday?

A.

Yes.

Q.
A.

Some DiU.I. cases about that time?
About 200 a year.

That was a good sized case.

Q.
Then you had a matter in St.
time?
A.

Yeah.

That's true.

Q.

Do you recall what that is?

- 10 -

George about

that

A. Parrish
Oil Tools was getting sued on
an
agreement.
It was also in the Supreme Court on a
Motion for Summary Disposition.
Q.
And was that the same Supreme Court case you had
coming up about the same time?
A.

Yes.

(R. Ill)

Mr. Morris was cross-examining concerning the pressure and
intensity of jury cases, particularly one he had in April, 1985
and asked:
Q.
Would you say that jury trials are probably your
most intense type of work that you do in your
practice? or did do?
A.

No.

Q.
What would
intense t h a n —
A.

The volume.

you

think of that

would

be

more

The pace.

Q.
So what you're talking about—you 're trying to
indicate that the level of intensity had to do with
the amount of work?
A.

Yes.

(R. 105)

Q.

What did you say?

A.
I said that we—the University Law School has
some type of a service for senior students to make a
few bucks, and it was just getting to the point, with
Ford Motor on the one hand and the N.L. Acme on the
other, and divorce cases going, that we were sending,
we were calling the U. Research, Student Research
more and more and more. Because you just plain can't
go spending a full day in court and a day—you know.
You just can't do it.
And we were just farming more
and more out to these law students.
Q.
Would it be safe to characterize that
practice was growing during this point in time?
A.
and

your

At one time it was me alone. Then it was JoAnn»
I out there in '81.
Then it was Lee and JoAnn
- 11 -

and I in the summer of '82. . .And then things just
kept, and--I just didn't want any more bodies around.
I just don't like big firms.
Q.

But you had the work for more people?

A.

The work was there.

Q.
Okay.
So you relate the intensity of your work
to the volume of work? Is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.
And in the past, when the volume of work had
become intense, you had gone out and expanded your
firm, is that correct?
A.
When it was apparent that this was not going
go away, that's what we would do. Or what I did.
Q.
But at this point in time in your life,
of '85, you did not want to expand any more?
correct?
A.

We didn't have any room.

to

in June
Is that

(R. 106, 107)

In looking at the calendars of work activities from
Mr. McRae's office, cross-examining attorney, Mr. Morris wisely
observed:
"Now,
Your
Honor,
these documents are
quite
voluminous, and I want to try to spare the Court the
necessity of going through the calendar here day by
day and finding out just how full Mr. McRae's days
were several months prior to this incident."
It was observed that the appellant put in a 50-hour week, (R.
70) but was trying to eliminate Saturday work and that his work
on Saturday, June 29 was unusual.

(R. 44)

Because of the busy

schedule prior to that, he had to schedule this very important
personal injury case deposition on Saturday, June 29.

It was a

very important case, (R. 44 and 45) and he was pressing to get
- 12 -

the case closed; preparation had taken quite a bit of time, and
he was also working on a very important divorce case with high
financial stakes, trying to close it up,

(R. 45, 46)

In

answer to a question about the early part of the week or the
week before, McRae answered:
A.
Well, the only thing specifically—I can just
generally tell you what the calendar was like in the
first half of 1985.
It was just plain hectic.
I
mean it just-Q.

Uh, huh.

A. You know, the girl's book as tight and as fast as
they can, and it has got worse and worse and worse.
Q.

What about June of 1985?

A.

It was no better.

(R. 54)

Speaking specifically of the week starting with
Sunday, June 23 the appellant had spent a day or two at Lake
Powell on a house boat, but was called Sunday the 23rd back to
the office for a serious emergency case and had to report to
the office on Monday, June 24 regarding something to do with an
emergency with Hatch River Expeditions.

(R. 55)

He also had a

matter in St. George on that Monday and in the Supreme Court and
some problems with the bankruptcy matter hanging over from the
previous week.

(R. 53)

After a busy week, Friday, June 28

involved depositions in the morning, two trials in the Circuit
Court and a meeting in the afternoon with a client in the oil
fields.

(R. 37)

Because of pain in his abdomen, which he

suspected might be an ulcer, he went to the hospital after lunch
- 13 -

on Friday, where he was given an EKG test and blood serum test.
They requested he stay in the hospital for the afternoon and
night, but he felt the pressure of his work and afternoon
schedule were more important.

(R. 41, 42, 43)

He then left the

hospital with a promise to report in early Saturday morning at
9:00 for repeat tests and met his clients in the oil fields
working with him until about 5 or 6:00 p.m.

(R.42)

He had

dinner downtown since his wife was out of town and reported for
the repeat EKG and blood test at the hospital at 9:00 Saturday
morning, June 29.

He then went back to the office to take care

of a deposition, though he usually did not work on Saturdays (R.
44-45), prepared his client for a half-hour or so and then met
with Steve Nebeker and the reporter for taking deposition.

At

about 11:00 Dr. Nielson called from the hospital and told him he
was "infarcting".
here."

"You're having a heart attack.

Get over

McRae told him he would be there as quick as he could,

but took time to finish the deposition, sent his secretary to
pick up his clothes, and drove three blocks to the hospital,
where he was immediately attached to equipment and sent by Air
Lifeline to the St. Mark's Hospital under the care of Dr. Clyde
Null.

After arriving by air in Salt Lake, he did not remember

much from that time until July 14.
coma but did have amnesia.

Apparently, he was not in a

He was apparently a very cantankerou

patient and was released to go home July 16.

(R. 50)

The

appellant had a triple bypass surgery on July 1, 1985 (R. 56)
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and nearly died twice, requiring emergency resuscitation.
58)

(R.

After being released from the hospital July 16, he returned

to the office an hour or so a day but did not start regularly
until August 10 or 12.

(R. 60)

He did not return to court work,

indicating that it scared him to go back into court.

(R. 61)

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

MCRAE'S CARDIAC ATTACK AROSE OUT OF OR IN THE
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.
THE APPLICANT'S ACTIVITIES
AS A TRIAL ATTORNEY ON JUNE 28-29, 1985 WERE
UNUSUALLY BUSY AND UNUSUALLY STRESSFUL, CAUSING
EXTREME TENSION AND CONCERN.
Section 35-1-45 provides an employee "who is injured,

by accident arising out of or during the course of employment
shall be entitled to compensation."

It is admitted that Mr.

McRae, as a trial attorney, engages frequently in office
activities and in trial work and, as shown by his report of his
activities the week prior, he travels to Salt Lake occasionally
and confers with clients, but by no stretch of the imagination
and certainly not supported by the evidence, could the Judge find
that his activities during the prior week and on Friday and
Saturday, June 28 and 29 were usual*and ordinary activities for
he or any other attorney and certainly were unusually stressful
as compared to the average man.

As observed by the Judge, the

Applicant engaged in a deposition in the morning, followed by twc
trials in the Circuit Court, and then a trip out to the oil
fields to meet with a client.

When he had severe stomach pains,

he went to the Ashley Valley Medical Center for a checkup.
- 15 -

After

tests, it was suggested that he be admitted to the hospital, but
he declined to do so and continued his strenuous activities of
that day, which included a trip to the oil fields to meet with a
client.

There is nothing in the record that would indicate two

trials and a deposition in one day were a usual activity for Mr*
McRae.

It was not a usual day.

It was a very strenuous and

stressful day, and the fact that he had to travel to the oil
fields to meet with an important client and return and then do
preparations for a deposition to be taken on Saturday, only adde<
to the stress and tension.

Mr. McRae enjoys relaxing and

boating, but was not able to take his boat out on Saturday the
29th because he had to tend to further legal activities and
engage in a very stressful deposition, which was very important
to his client and that case.

Before engaging in the deposition

he went to the Ashley Valley Medical Center again Saturday
morning for repeat blood tests and another EKG, and then went to
his office, where he engaged in the taking of a deposition.
During the course of the deposition and around 11:00 a.m. he was
called by his doctor and told to report to the hospital, that he
was having a heart attack; and, of course, that added to the
stress and tension.
ONLY SLIGHT PHYSICAL EXERTION IS REQUIRED
The compensability of an employee's death arising from
a heart attack subsequent to unusual physical exertion while in
the course of employment was addressed in Nazum v. Roosendahl
- 16 -

Construction & Mining Corp,, Utah, 565 p.2d. 1144 (1977).

There,

the employee drove a ten-wheel dump truck for a construction
company. Usually, the dump bed was activated by a switch in the
cab, but on the day of the accident this switch malfunctioned anc
the employee had to step down from the cab and activate a
secondary device located in the passenger side of the dump bed.
Evidence adduced at the hearing indicated that the employee had
climbed down from the cab and activated the manual device at
least six times.

Later, as he stepped down from the cab to

activate the device, he stumbled to the ground, suffering from a
heart attack, and died within minutes thereafter.
The Industrial Commission denied compensation, ruling
that the employee's death resulted from a pre-existing heart
condition and not from the exertion required by his employment.
The medical testimony presented during the hearing indicated thaJ
an extra burden had been placed on the employee's heart as he
stepped from the cab several times, enhancing the heart's
abnormal rhythms which contributed to his death.
Reviewing this evidence, the Supreme Court concluded:
Even though it is true that [the employee] had the
pre-existing heart weakness described above, the
immutable facts are:
that he was working on his
job; that because of a mechanical defect in his
large truck he was put to the necessity of
repeatedly hoisting himself up these abnormally
long steps into the cab and was thus put to a
greater exertion than normally would have been
required if the truck had been operating properly;
and that this placed such stress on his already
weakened heart that it could not cope with the
- 17 -

burden;
death.

wherefore,

it failed and resulted in his

Based upon this interpretation of the evidence, the Court held
that the employee's death resulted from an accidental occurrence
that arose out of and in the course of his employment, and
remanded the case to the Industrial Commission to make the
appropriate award.

Merely climbing in and out of the cab was

found to be sufficient exertion to recover benefits.
ONLY USUAL EXERTION IS REQUIRED
The landmark case of Purity Biscuit Co, v. Industrial
Commission, Utah, 201 P.2d 961 (1949), requires only USUAL
exertion.

There, the employee, a delivery truck driver, was

awarded workmen's compensation when it was determined that his
employment aggravated and contributed to a diseased spine. - The
accident occurred when the employee pressed down on the brake
pedal of his truck, which created pressure on an intervertebral
disc, forcing it to protrude into his spine causing great pain t
the employee and paralysis of his legs.

The employer appealed

the Industrial Commission's award.
The issue as framed by the Utah Supreme Court was
whether the employee had suffered a compensable accidental injui
where the employee had only engaged in normal exertions require(
daily in his work.

Affirming the award, the Court propounded tl

following significant principles of workmen compensation law:
(1) Workmen's compensation coverage is extended to
an employee who becomes disabled through internal
failure which is caused by ordinary exertion,
- 18 -

without unusually heavy labor in excess of the
employee's ordinary duties; (2) the terms "injury
by accident" only require that the result be
accidental, which in turn is satisfied if the
injury or death is unexpected and unintentional;
and (3) workmen's compensation coverage is to be
liberally construed and should be resolved in
favor of recovery if there is doubt.
In Purity Biscuit, Justice Wolfe, in a specially
concurring opinion, stated that evidence of unusual exertion was
not required for an award of workmen's compensation where
evidence established that the employee's usual exertion in the
course of his employment caused his injury.

He did note,

however, that evidence of unusual exertion immediately prior to
the injury is a higher quality evidence that more clearly
establishes that the employment was the actual cause of, and not
merely coincidental to the injury or death.

Harmonizing the

majority opinion with Justice Wolfe's concurring opinion, it is
clear that lack of evidence showing unusual exertion is not fatal
to a claim for compensation, arising from internal failure,
although its presence is helpful in establishing causation.
principles propounded in Purity Biscuit were reaffirmed in
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Utah, 617 P.2d 693
(1980), wherein the Utah Supreme Court stated:
It
is equally well settled the
injury
received
may be accidental even though
the
exertion is that required in the ordinary course
of employment.
If an employee incurs unexpected
injuries, including internal failures, caused by
the ordinary duties of his employment he is
eligible for compensation under [Utah Code Ann.]
35-1-45.
- 19 -

The

Obviously, the Judge should have found that the events
of Friday June 28 and Saturday June 29, during the course of his
employment were exceedingly stressful, caused greater than usual
stress, caused great tension and that the heart attack that
occurred was unanticipated and unforeseen and an accident for
which the Applicant is entitled to Workman's Compensation
benefits.

All attorneys know the stress of Court work, and

many, even experienced attorneys, experience nausea and diarrhea
before even minor trials.
POINT II: THE MEDICAL TESTIMONY OF DR. NULL, THE TREATING
PHYSICIAN,
SHOWS THAT MR,
MCRAE 9 S
DISABLING
MYOCARDIAL
INFARCTION WAS
WORK-RELATED.
THE
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE VIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE
TO THE APPLICANT.
Dr. F. Clyde Null, M.D. F.A.C.P., is a specialist in
cardiovascular disease, internal medicine, is a diplomat in the
American Board of Internal Medicine and practices at the St.
Mark's Hospital.

The Commission have frequently used him for

medical panels in determining the complex questions involving th
cardiovascular field; and for many years, Dr. Null has provided
the Commission with the benefit of his extensive experience in
determining the cause and rating of heart disease problems.
In his letter of September 12, 1985 (Exhibit A-l,
p. 3 ) , Dr. Null states as follows:
Atheroslcerotic heart disease,
of course, is
exacerbated under symptoms of angina pectorus or
made much worse under periods of emotional stress,
pressure
and tension.
Prolonged
hours
of
activity, striking degree of physical exertion,
exposure to cold, or marked emotional pressure and
- 20 -

tension frequently result in increase symptoms
referable to the heart.
Mr. McRae has underlying
atherosclerotic heart disease, and of course, all
of the symptoms of that disorder can be made worse
by heavy work loads and excessive
emotional
pressure and tension.
The doctor further states in the same Exhibit, p. 1, referring tc
the Applicant, Mr. McRae, as follows:
He
exhibits a 35% impairment and
Class
II
symptomatology on the basis of the above diagnosis.
He exhibits this permanent physical impairment and
will require continuing medical therapy for an
indefinite period of time.
In my opinion, the
emotional
stress and tension related to
his
occupation
are certainly associated
with
an
aggravation to produce his myocardial infarction.
(R. 125)
We must note and take into account the fact that Dr.
Null was his treating physician during his pre-surgery care and
followed the surgical procedures and then was his doctor in all
post-surgery developments.

He prepared the medical records,

instructed in the taking of medical tests and read the results.
He had the opportunity of interviewing with his wife and with
Mr. McRae himself and observing first-hand all of the events
surrounding his heart attacks and the reasons therefore.
On the other hand, Dr. Perry, who was not the treating
physician, but was hired by the Defendants to review the
Applicant's condition, set up a brief appointment and saw the
Applicant for a few minutes, listened to his heart, briefly
checked over the records placed in his hands, and then answered
the questions posed by the Defendants audibly so that the
- 21 -

Applicant could hear them, all as described in the Applicant's
letter, attached hereto as Exhibit 1 of September 18, 1986 in
paragraph 2.

He states:

Dr. Perry was a gross disappointment.
His
nurse took my blood pressure, weight, and put me
in the examining room. Dr. Perry came in in about
10 minutes. He opened my file which had been sent
to him by the Fund or Commission and immediately
asked what he was supposed to do and why was he
involved.
He read the transmittal letter which
contained, 1 believe, four questions for him to
answer.
He
read through the
file,
which
apparently was a copy of Dr. Null's office file
dated back to 1970 which covered periodic routine
physicals. He ask a few questions and 1 again retold my story of the events leading up to my heart
attack.
He had me lie down on the examining
table, listened to my heart with a stethoscope and
told me to put my shirt back on. He then re-read
the questions, the first one, if I remember, in
substance ask for his opinion asking whether or
not work related stress contributed to the heart
attack and then he mumbled "no".
He read the
other three questions and mumbled "yes" as to
each. He then said he would read my file which he
had not read prior to my seeing him, and write his
report. (R. 424)
The brief one-page report of Dr. Perry's (R. 226) was
the basis for Judge Sumsion's denial of benefits to the
Applicant. (R.394) Certainly such a report should not be given
equal standing with the report of the treating physician, but if
it is given any credence, it should be a basis for submission of
the questions of aggravation and causation to a medical panel.
The law is well established that in cases of doubt or conflict
of opinion, the evidence should be viewed in light most
favorable to the Applicant.

(Prows v. Industrial Commission,

610 P.2d 1362 (UT 1980)
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POINT III: A HEART ATTACK WHICH OCCURS AS A RESULT OF STRESS
AND
THE AGGRAVATION OF A PRE-EXISTING
HEART
CONDITION IS COMPENSABLE AS AN ACCIDENT UNDER UTAH
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION LAW.
EMOTIONAL STRESS AND STRAIN
More recent cases in the workmen's compensation area
have addressed compensability for injuries induced or caused by
the employee's emotional stress while in the course of
employment.

Indeed, recent decisions seem to establish a trend

where employees are awarded compensation for injuries caused by
emotional stress or strain:

"The first category is that in whic

a mental (as distinguished from a physical) impact or stimulus
results in a distinct physical injury.
uniformly find compensability."
Law 42.21 (Matthew Bender, 1979).

Here the decisions

Larson, Workman's Compensation
More specifically, the trend

is to award compensation in heart attack cases where such in
induced by emotional stress or strain while in the course of
employment:
When the caused component in a heart failure
or cerebral hemorrhage case is mental, nervous,
psychic or emotional rather than physical, the
commonest legal question has been whether this
could be said to be an 'injury' for compensation
purposes.
As will be shown later, the cases are
virtually unanimous in holding that such a result
is indeed an 'injury', although the o.rigin of the
episode may have been nonphysical.
A case indicative of this recent trend is Little v. J.
Korber t Co., 71 N.M. 294, 378 P.2d 119 (1963).

There, the

employee, a department manager, became upset when he discovered
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that a clerk had made an error on a charge ticket.

The employee

made known his anger over the error to the company's office
manager.

Later that morning, the employee collapsed and died

near his desk.

The trial court found that the employee, while i

the course of employment, became emotionally upset and as a
result thereof, died of a myocardial infarction.
was awarded to the employee's dependents.

Compensation

Both the employer anc

its insurance carrier appealed contending that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that the cause of the employee's deatl
was his employment.
Reviewing the lower court record, the New Mexico
Supreme Court found that the medical experts agreed generally
that "an emotional upset results in stress upon the heart as mu<
as physical stress, and that anger may be a precipitating cause
of heart attacks, either disabling or fatal."

Based upon this

conclusion the Supreme Court affirmed the judgement of the lowe
court and held:
After a painstaking review of the record, it is our
considered judgment that the evidence meets the
requirements of substantiation and we hold that the
evidence
in this case establishes
a
causal
relationship and that [the employee], in the course
of his employment,
became emotionally
upset,
suffered an accidental injury, and as a result
thereof died of a myocardial infarction...
In a recent case, Archer v. Industrial Commission, 12
Ariz. 199, 619 P.2d 27 (1980), the court reviewed an award of
death benefits to dependents of a worker who had died from
myocardial infarction.

The court in that case, citing ASARCO,
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Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 122 Ariz. 2412, 594 P.2d 107
(Ariz. App. 1979) and City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission,
120 Ariz. 237, 585 P.2d 257 (Ariz. App. 1978), stated that "the
test for determining the measure of emotional stress is not a
subjective one", but "an objective one, (i.e., do the duties
imposed by the job subject the claimant to greater stress than
his fellow employees?)".
This trend is followed in Utah.
The standard for evaluating heart attack cases in the
State of Utah is outlined in the 1983 Pittsburgh Testing
Laboratory v. Keller case, 657 P.2d 1367, which quotes the Powers
v. Industrial Commission 1967 Case 427 P.2d 740, a case involving
a pre-existing heart condition indicating, in that case, the
Court said:
The law is well settled that the aggravation or
lighting up of a pre-existing disease by
an
industrial accident is compensable and that an
internal failure brought about by exertion in the
course of employment may be an accident within the
meaning of the act.
The Applicant showed by preponderance of the evidence
that he was engaged in an unusual stressful day's activity on
Friday, June 28, and there was no evidence to refute that.

The

events following his tensions and stressful day were certainly
unanticipated and unforeseen; and, therefore, an accident as
defined by the Workman's Compensation statutes.
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The recent

Keller case quoted above in relating the term "accident" to a
heart attack, the Keller case defines it as follows:
It (the term accidental) simply means that the
effort exerted, considering the position in which
the workman was put by the work being done at the
instant of the injury, was such that an injury,
unanticipated and unforeseen,
resulted to the
workman.
In the Keller case, we find a striking similarity to
the McRae case before us.

Mr. Keller had had a previous

myocardial infarction in 1965, followed by exertional angina.
was hospitalized in 1973 for a suspected acute infarction.

H

In

1978 he was diagnosed as having a myocardial infarction; and
further testing revealed severe coronary arterial disease of lor
standing, which was treated by an extensive coronary bypass
surgery.

Four days before his death, Mr. Keller had been in a

work situation in the dome of a building where the heat was
excessive, described as "very warm and extremely stuffy."

Mr.

Keller had to be removed from the area and given oxygen; but
after resting, he drove himself back to his home.
later, Keller died, and benefits were granted.

Three days

Mr. McRae's was

more fortunate and certainly has a more convincing case because
his symptoms and infarction occurred immediately at the time of
his most extreme stress, not three days later, and he had to be
immediately hospitalized.

In the Keller case, the medical pane

did not link Keller's heart attack with the stresses he
experienced in the ceiling of the building four days earlier.
However, Mrs. Keller objected to the Findings of the medical
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panel and introduced the testimony of Dr. Frank Yanowitz, who
testified that the stress he experienced in the ceiling affected
Mr. Keller's heart, and this subsequently lead to the heart
attack which he experienced three to four days later.

The

Administrative Law Judge adopted the Findings of Dr. Yanowitz an
rejected the medical panel report and found that the events in
the ceiling produced a coronary insufficiency which eventually
lead to the deceased's myocardial infarction and ultimately
resulted in his death.

The Industrial Commission upheld the

Administrative Law Judge's opinion, and subsequently, the Suprem
Court upheld the Commission.
Again we urge that the fact of the present case of
Robert McRae are even more convincing in favor of a recovery tha
that of Mr. Keller.
In the case of Marie T. Mabbott, involving the heart
attack death of Fred Mabbott v. Price River Coal Company, the
Judge's Order, dated December 20, 1984, found that Mr. Mabbott,
who was found dead after sitting down to eat his lunch, had diec
of a coronary insufficiency even though three doctors agreed thf
Mr. Mabbott was a high-risk candidate for a sudden cardiac deatl
Dr. Perry, as a medical panel, and Dr. Yanowitz determined that
though the Applicant was a high risk because of his heart
condition, age, hypertension, diabetes, gout and other problems
it appeared that he was engaged in a stressful job and that
emotional stress and pressures could aggravate and further
- 27 -

increase the myocardial oxygen demands and that there was a
causal relationship between the activities that Mr. Mabbott
performed and the stresses that he was under which eventually
lead to his demise.

There was only circumstantial evidence

concerning the activities the deceased was engaged in at the
time.

Benefits were allowed, and the Commission upheld the

Judge, and the Supreme Court upheld the Commission.

The case is

cited as Price River Coal v. Industrial Commission, 49 Utah Adv.
Rep. 27, December 31, 1986, and found, under the Allen case that
the decedent died "by accident since his heart attack was
certainly an unexpected or unintended" event that resulted in hi
death.

As indicated in the Elton case, stress can be and is

analogous to exertion.

This is a well-accepted principal in

Utah.
In the case involving Judge Leonard Elton, who died
May 13, 1970 ^s the result of a stroke, Elton v. Utah State
Retirement Board, 22 UT 2d. 368, the Court, after carefully
analyzing the Judge's activities on the Bench, observed that
"this Court has previously determined that aggravation of a preexisting disease by an industrial accident is compensable and
that an internal failure brought about by exertion in the course
of employment may be an accident within the meaning of the Utah
Workman's Compensation Act,",

following the "Powers v.

Industrial Commission" case referred to above.

The case refers

to some of the difficult and sensitive cases he was hearing at
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the time and observed that he was hearing extensive arguments on
one of his cases.

In between some of these events he was home

ill and then returned to work during April, then on Wednesday,
May 6 he had returned to work carrying a full case load.

On May

12 he made a ruling on an important case and heard an annulment
and a divorce. He had a jury case scheduled for May 13, but he
died that morning.

The testimony indicated that his health was

deteriorating, brought about by stresses of highly sensitive
cases handled by him the last six weeks of his life.

His

physician testified that Judge Elton suffered from a vascular
disease, resulting from insufficient blood supply to the brain,
and that this condition was aggravated by the stresses of Judge
Elton's employment and that these stresses were the principal
factors in cutting short his life.

The Court found as follows:

The record supports the trial court's conclusion
that Judge Elton died as a result of an accident
arising
out
of or in the
course
of
his
employment. . . (Addendum 6)
I am sure that the appellant judges and all attorneys
will freely acknowledge that there is much more tension,
pressure, stress related to practicing law as an attorney before
the Courts than there is as in a Judge hearing the matters.
Judge Elton's last day certainly was not as stressful as that of
June 28th day of the Applicant's.

The Judge Elton's case is ver

analogous to the case of the Applicant, Robert McRae.

Mr. McRae

had a pre-existing vascular disease resulting in insufficient
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blood supply and had symptoms on and off in the prior weeks and
before that indicating his pre-existing condition.

As the doctc

testified in the Elton case, so Dr. Null presented evidence in
the present case that the stresses connected with the current
activities of the Applicant aggravated and brought about the
heart attack of June 28 and 29.

(R. 125)

In the United States Steel Corporation v. Draper, 613
p.2d 508 (Utah 1980) a case where the deceased workman suffered
fatal heart attack after running to the aid of a fellow employee
the Court reiterated as follows:
The fact that the deceased had a pre-existing
diseased condition of his heart does not preclude a
finding that his death resulted from an accident in
the course of his employment.
This Court has long
ago and repeatedly recognized that, despite any
pre-existing condition of disease or disability, if
there is an incident, properly regarded as an
accident in the course of work which adds to or
aggravates that condition, any resulting injury is
compensable.
The Powers case, of course, stated that:
The law is well settled that the aggravation or
lighting up of a pre-existing disease by an
industrial accident is compensable...
The ultimate authority, Professor Larson, states as follows:
Pre-existing disease or infirmity of the employee
does not disqualify a claim under the 'arising out
of
employment' requirement if the
employment
aggravated,
accelerated, or combined with the
disease or infirmity to produce the death or
disability
for which compensation is
sought.
(Desk Edition, Vol. 1, Section 12.20, 1985).
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POINT

IV:

THE MCRAE CASE MEETS THE TEST OF THE ALLEN AND
LANCASTER CASES WHICH ADOPT THE USUAL EXERTION AND
UNEXPECTED RESULT TESTS AND MEETS THE TEST THAT HIS
EMPLOYMENT CONTRIBUTED SOMETHING SUBSTANTIAL TO
INCREASE THE RISK HE ALREADY FACED IN EVERYDAY LIFE
BECAUSE OF HIS CONDITION.
In considering this case in the light of two recent

cases, Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 {UT 1986) and
Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, Supreme Court No. 20897 (UT
April 20, 1987), it appears the Supreme Court has adopted the
Purity Biscuit Company test that an "ordinary or usual exertion
is sufficient to meet the "by accident" definition.

On page

three of the Lancaster case which involved a heart attack, quotec
Allen as follows:
In Allen, we embraced the definition of Mby
accident" first formulated in Purity Biscuit Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961
(1949).
We rejected the position that an accident
requires an unusual event or occurrence.
729 P.2d
at 20. An ordinary or usual exertion is sufficient
to meet the "by accident" definition if "the result
of an exertion was different from what would
normally be expected to occur, the occurrence was
unplanned, unforeseen, unintended and therefore by
accident."
729 P.2d at 22.
The critical factor
when determining whether an incident is by accident
is unexpectedness. 729 P.2d at 22.
Despite a finding that the heart attack was
unexpected, the administrative law judge concluded
there
was no accident primarily because
the
claimant was undertaking his usual work duties.
That conclusion cannot stand in light of the
standard set forth in Allen. Although the claimant
had experienced similar pains four days earlier, he
had not been advised of the etiology of those pains
and he had no forewarning that they would occur
again on February 17.
Moreover, there is nothing
in the claimant's job duties to suggest that he
would suffer a heart attack. There is overwhelming
evidence that the claimant did not intend to have a
- 31 -

heart attack, nor did he anticipate one.
These
factors, taken together with the finding that the
myocardial infarction was the "unexpected" result
of an exertion in the workplace, require the
conclusion that the heart attack was "by accident."
Our case, being a heart attack case, is similar to the
Lancaster.

Like the Lancaster case, the McRae heart attack

meets the two tests of an accident as stated above:
1.
employment

The

while

heart

attack occurred during the

the applicant was under

unusual

course
stress

evi

though only usual or ordinary stress or exertion is required.
2.

The event was unexpected.

As stated

above,

"There is overwhelming evidence that the claimant did not
to have a heart attack, nor did he anticipate one."
had

inte

He, in fac

an active week qirite free of stress and then Friday though

he had an ulcer problem.
Since we have admitted that McRae had a pre-existing
heart condition, two more tests apply.

The Allen and Lancaster

cases say we must analyze the causal connection between the hea
attack and the working condition to find both a legal cause and
medical cause:
1.
condition
substantial
life.

Under

must
to

legal cause a claimant with a

show that the employment

contributed

increase the risk he already faced

(729 P.2d 26)

- 32 -

pre-existi

in

somethi
everyd

2.
stress,

Under the medical cause the claimant must show th<

strain or exertion required by his occupation led to th<

resulting injury or disability. (729 P.2d 27)
As to (1) legal cause, the claimant worked at a very
stressful job as shown on pages 8-13.

In fact, the Judge so

found:
It is difficult to quantify the stress associated
with the applicant's particular practice of law.
It is probably safe to assume that it was a more
stressful
practice than engaged in by
most
attorneys, but there is no indication that it was
uniquely stressful.
(R. 392)
This is not to say that he was not working under
stressful circumstances.
To the contrary, as
noted previously, the applicant's type and style
of practice could justifiably be characterized as
more stressful than most attorneys. (R. 392)
Furthermore, the stress was extreme on this particular
Friday and Saturday because of the Circuit Court trials,
appointments and rush travel to the outfields delayed because of
an unexpected medical checkup.

A stressful deposition on

Saturday was unusually stressful and unique, not only because it
was a crucial deposition, but also because McRae did not
ordinarily work on Saturday.
As to (2) medical causes, the medical expert and
treating physician, Dr. Null, stated:
In my opinion, the emotional stress and tension
related to his occupation are certainly associated
with an aggravation to produce his myocardial
infarction. (R. 125)
Mr. McRae has underlying atherosclerotic heart
disease, and, of course, all of the symptoms of
- 33 -

that disorder can be made worse
loads
and excessive emotional
tension, (R. 128)

by heavy
pressure

work
and

Neither the Judge nor Dr. Perry agreed that there was
a medical causation, but both came to that erroneous conclusion
on the false premise that the last week and that particular
Friday and Saturday, dates of the heart attack were not unusual
to the claimant.
Dr. Perry erroneously stated and based his erroneous
findings on the following:
There was no change in his job requirements, the
physical activity, number or hours worked or
stress in the months prior to his myocardial
infarction, compared to the years before this
occurred. (R. 226)
The Judge erroneously adopted the erroneous findings
Dr. Perry as his own (R. 394) and further found:
No convincing evidence of any unusual or acute
stress
with regard to the applicant's
work
activities on the date of, or preceding, the onset
of the symptoms. . . during that last week of
June, 1985, there wasn't any significant change in
his job requirements,
the level of physical
activity, the number or hours worked, or the
stresses he experienced in the months
prior
thereto. (R. 393)
Dr. Perry and the Judge erred in two regards:
Error Number 1:

The record (Brief Pages 8-15) clearl

shows unusual and increasing stressful conditions that last wee
climaxed by increasing symptoms Friday and Saturday.

(R. 41-4£

Claimant's work load was so heavy during that last week that he
had to schedule a stressful deposition on Saturday when he
- 34 -

usually rested.

(R. 44)

Obviously this week was an unusually

stressful six-day week.
Error Number 2:

The test required by the Allen case is

not comparing the claimant's workload or work conditions with his
own prior employment work load or work condition but must compart
the claimant's exertions to stress during the week of June 23-29
and Friday and Saturday, June 28 and 29 with "the exertions of
normal non-employment life of this or any other person.'1
38.83 (b)

(Larsei

The following quotes from the Allen case makes this

clear:
We also accept Larson's suggestion that
the
comparison between the usual and unusual exertion
be defined according to an objective standard.
Note
that the comparison is not with
this
employee's usual exertion in his employment but
with the exertions of normal non-employment life
of this or any other person. 729 P.2d 27)
Thus the precipitating exertion must be compared
with the usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life, not the non-employment life of
the particular worker. (p. 27)
In evaluating typical non-employment activity, the
focus is on what typical non-employment activities
are generally expected of people in
today's
society, not what this particular claimant is
accustomed to doing. (p. 27)
The Court went on to state that "typical activities an
exertions expected of men and women" were carrying out full
garbage cans, lifting baggage or a child, climbing stairs or
changing a tire.
Judge Sumsion has already typified claimant's law
practice as generally more stressful than other attorneys'.
- 35 -

The

Appeals Court can certainly take official notice that a law
practice of the usual attorney and particularly that of Mr, McRa
was far more stressful than the stress of exertions of nonemployment life of he or the usual man.
the Judge Elton case.

This is also shown in

Also being required by his employer to

continue to work even after having serious pains caused even
greater anxiety and stress on Friday June 28 and Saturday June
29 than could ever be conceived of in everyday non-employment
life.
POINT V:

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ACTED ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY IN NOT REFERRING THE MATTER TO A
MEDICAL PANEL AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE APPLICANT
SUFFERED A HEART ATTACK DURING THE COURSE OF HIS
EMPLOYMENT AS A RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT.
Section 35-1-77 U.C.A. provides that when there are

medical questions, especially when there is a conflict in the
medical evidence, the matter may be referred to a medical panel,
The Administrative Law Judge should not act as the third medical
expert in determining which of the medical experts' opinion is
the most accurate and should be accepted.
The facts set forth clearly indicate that the Applicai
was engaging in extremely stressful activities on Friday, being
involved in a deposition and two court trials, and under
pressures to keep an appointment by driving out into the oil
fields and then making proper preparations for another deposits
the next day, which was a Saturday (of course, Saturday was the
usual day of relaxing as a weekend activity).
- 36 -

POINT VI: ALL DOUBTS ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF A
WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM DUE TO THE REMEDIAL
NATURE OF SUCH LEGISLATION.
The overriding principle which governs adjudication of
Workers' Compensation disability claims is that such claims are
to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits and that
any doubts from the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the
claimant.

Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 1362, 1363-6'

(Utah 1980), citing Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 184
^ 0 2 0 , 1021-22 (Utah 1919).

The Church of Jesus Christ of

Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328, 332
(Utah 1979) (Dissenting opinion).

McPhie v. Industrial

Commission , 56 7 P . 2 d 1 5 3 , 15 5 (I !: t a 1 i ..1 9 ? 7 ) , Askrew v. Indus
Commission, 39 I I • 2 I 302, 304 (Utah 1 96 4).

M & K Corp. v.

Industrial Commission, 189 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah 1948).

The

Applicant respectfully requests that to the extent that the
questions raised herein are close questions, that all such doubt:
be resolved in favor

of an award of benefits.
CONCLUSION

The claimant, McRae, was a hard driven trial attorney
whose law practice was exceeding stressful, as shown by the
transcript and acknowledged by the Judge and was certainly far
more stressful than that of the non-employment life of the
ordinary man, particularly on the dates of June 28 and 29, 1985,
when he worked under the stress and anxiety of abdominal pains
and finished his work on Saturday under the stress and anxiety
- 37 -

of knowing he was in the middle of a heart attack.
extreme and substantial stress.

That is an

Neither the Judge, the

Commission, nor Dr. Perry had a transcript of the hearing.
The Commission, in considering the Motion for Review,
did not have a transcript made up and did not have the facts
available in its review.

The Denial of the Motion for Review

should be given very little weight in considering this appeal.
Only Dr. Null, a heart specialist, knew McRae's full
story and clearly stated the emotional stress and tension of his
work caused an aggravation to produce his myocardial infarction.
All tests are met for claimant to recover workman's compensation
benefits. The Orders of the Administrative Law Judge and the
Industrial Commission should be reversed and remanded to allow
recovery of Workman's Compensation benefits to claimant.
DATED this 16th day of February, 1988.
Respectfully submitted,

Attorney for the Applicant
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ADDENDUM

1 . C L / D L NULL, M 0..f

A.C.P.

PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE-INTERNAL MEDICINE
DIPLOMATE. AMERICAN BOARD O F INTERNAL MEDICINE
SUITE 3 F , ST. MARK'S OFFICE BUILDING
1 2 2 0 EAST 3 9 0 0
SALT

LAKE

SOUTH STREET

CITY, U T A H

TELEPHONE

\su 0v "

S-4t«-4

2 6 3 - 3 8 9 2

September 12, 1985

Keith E. Sohm
RULON T. BURTON & ASSOCIATES
1935 E. Vine Street, Suite 340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

Re:

Robert M. McRae

Dear Mr. Sohm:
In response to your letter of September 5, 1985 the following information
is submitted.
Atheroscerotic heart disease, of course, is exacerbated under sypmtoms
of angina pectorus or made much worse under periods of emotional stress,
pressure and tension. Prolonged hours of activity, striking degree of physical
exertion, exposure to cold, or marked emotional pressure and tension frequently
result in increase symptoms referable to the heart. Mr. McRae has underlying
atherosclerotic heart disease, and of course, all of the symptoms of that
disorder can be made worse by heavy work loads and excessive emotional pressure
and tension. If further details are needed, this office may be contacted.
Very truly yours,

F//Clyde Nulll, M.D., F. A.C.P.
FCN/cb
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing brief
were personally delivered to the offices of the Industrial
Commission, Erie Boorman of the Second Injury Fund, with a copy
to Administrative Law Judge Richard G. Sumsion and a copy to
Elliott K. Morris of the Workers Compensation Fund, this 16th da
of February, 1988.

Keith E. Sohm
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£\UUULMJVl*l

t*

July 15, 1986

According to the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment of the American Medical Association,
Committee on Rating of Mental and Physical Impairment, copyright 1971, page 81- He exhibits a 35% impairment
and Class II symptomatology on the basis of the above diagnosis.
It is my opinion that he will continue to require medical therapy for this mil Hull i't likelihood of
further improvement without additional surgery on medical therapy Is unlikely.
I do not see any reason for additional surgical Intervention at this ixjint, and thl'j man continues to
exhibit the symptomatology as indicated above.
He exhibits this pennament physical impairment and will require continuing medical therapy for an
indefinite period of time. In my opinion, the emotional stress and tension related to his occupation are
certainly associated with an aggravation to produce his myocardial infarction.
If further details are needed, this office nn be contacted.

FOJ/bf
cc:

Robert McRae

ADDENDUM 2

Enc.
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ADDENDUM i

McRAE S
ATTORNEYS
309

DELAND
AT

LAW
T H E WHITLEY M A N S I O N
132 S O U T H 6 0 0 EAST

EAST IOO N O R T H

VERNAL UTAH 84078
HALLS CR0S5INC UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84102

T E L E P H O N E (SOI) 6 S - * - 2 2 3 3 E X T E N S I O N m

T E L E P H O N E (SOD 3 6 4 - 1333

T E L E P H O N E (SOD 7 8 9 - 1 6 6 6
ROBERT M McRAE
JOANN 8 aTRlNGHAM
L A OEVER

LONI F DELAND

September 1 8 , 1986

Mr. Keith E. Sohm
Attorney at Law
2057 Lincoln Lane
Salt Lake City, UT
Re:

HCRSCHEL P SULLEN
CONNIE MOWER

84124

Robert M. McRae
Injury: 6/28/85

Dear Keith:
I kept my appointments with Drs. McCann and Perry as
scheduled on September 16, 1986. Dr. McCann appeared to be
somewhat of a novice as to why he was involved. After taking
a history and spending my one hour, he then re-read the
medical questions posed to him to answer and then said I
needed to take an MMPI test and see a Dr. Cooper, PHD,
Psychitrist, in his office for some more tests. The earliest
that this could be set was 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. on September
17. When I learned that I needed to get back to Vernal, I
took the written test earlier on the 17th, only to discover
that Dr. Cooper was going to need an hour plus of my time and
I couldn't stay that late in Salt Lake. I think this is very
poor planning and feel that someone owes for some travel, time
and expense as well as being away from work unnecessarily.
Dr. Perry was a gross disappointment. His nurse took
my blood pressure, weight, and put me in the examining room.
Dr. Perry came in in about 10 minutes. He opened my file
which had been sent to him by the Fund or Commission and
immediately ask what he was supposed to do and why was he
involved. He read the transmittal letter which contained, I
believe, four questions for him to answer. He read through
the file, which apparently was a copy of Dr. Null's office
file dated back to 1970 which covered periodic routine
physicals. He ask a few questions and I again re-told my
story of the events leading up to my heart attact. He had me
lie down on the examining table, listened to my heart with a
stethoscope and told me to put my shirt back on. He then
re-read the questions, the first one, if I remember, in
substance ask for his opinion asking whehter or not work
related stress contributed to the heart attack and then he
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Mr. Sohm
September 18, 1986
Page 2
mumbled "no". He read the other three questions and mumbled
\f,yes" as to each. He then said he would read my file which he
\had not read prior to my seeing him, and write his report,.
Later in the afternoon 1 had occasion to talk to Dr.
Null on the phone and described to him Dr. Perry's exam. Dr.
Null indicated that Dr. Perry had a tendency to be abrupt and
quick on decisions and that in his opinion, as I interpreted
what Dr. Null said, Dr. Perry did not consider the entirety of
the medical history in conjunction with the incicent of June
29, 1985. Personally I belive Dr. Perry had inadequate
medical history and further that any conclusions he jumped to
were without any adequate foundation or physical exam.
If you have not been supplied with copies of the
physician question letters, I suggest that you obtain them and
also find out what history information was supplied each
doctor in order for them to formulate opinions. As soon as 1
know when I will be in Salt Lake next I will make myself
available to Dr. Cooper.
Sincerely,

Robert M. McRae
RMM i pill
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No:

ROBERT M. MCRAE,

*
*
*
*
*

Applicant,
vs.
MCRAE AND DELAND and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,

*
*
*
*
*
*

Defendants.

85000739

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On June 22, 1987, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying the
applicant in the above-captioned case workers compensation benefits related to
a June 29, 1985 incident in the course of employment and subsequent triple
by-pass heart surgery performed on July 1, 1985. The Administrative Law Judge
denied all benefits because the Administrative Law Judge found that neither
legal nor medical causation were established.
The Administrative Law Judge
cited the case Allen vs the Industrial Commission, 729 P2d 15 (Utah 1986) as
authority for the proposition that both legal and medical cause must be
established before an injury in the course of employment is compensable. The
Administrative
Law
Judge
found
that
the
applicant's
pre-existing
arteriosclerotic heart condition required the applicant show that unusual
exertion in the course of employment caused the need for the by-pass surgery
in order to establish legal causation. The Administrative Law Judge found the
events leading up to the hospitilization and surgery did not constitute
unusual exertion.
Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge found legal
causation was not established.
Furthermore, the Administrative Law Judge
found that the medical evidence taken as a whole, did not confirm that work
related stress caused the need for surgery, and thus the Administrative Law
Judge found no medical causation.
As neither of the two elements of
compensability
were
established
(legal
arid
medical
causation),
the
Administrative
Law Judge found
the June 29, 1985
incident was not
compensable.
On August 10, 1987, pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-82.53, counsel for the
applicant filed a Motion for Review. Counsel for the applicant argues that
aggravation of a pre-existing condition is compensable according to both
statutory and case law.
He states that any question regarding whether an
aggravation occurred should be submitted to a medical panel for resolution and
should not be decided by the Administrative Law Judge.
Counsel for the
applicant cites numerous pre-Allen Supreme Court cases as authority for the
proposition
that only usual
exertion
is required
for a finding of
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compensability. On the other hand, counsel for the applicant maintains that
the applicant was exposed to unusual exertion leading up to the by-pass
surgery in the form of work related stress. Counsel for the applicant cites
pre-Allen cases involving facts similar to the facts of the instant case as
authority for the conclusion that stress can be exertion. Counsel for the
applicant concludes that the work related stress the applicant experienced was
unusual exertion which aggravated his pre-existing arteriosclerotic heart
disease causing the need for by-pass surgery.
Therefore, counsel for the
applicant finds the June 29, 1985 wot k stress resulting
in coronary
insufficiency is compensable.
On August 17, 1987, counsel foe the defendant/Workers Compensation
Fund filed a Response to the applicant's Motion for Review. Counsel for the
defendant states U.C.A. 35-1-77*s permissive language gives the Administrative
Law Judge the discretion whether to refer a medical question to a medical
panel for resolution. Counsel for the defendant states it is therefore not
improper for the Administrative Law Judge to determine no medical panel
referral is necessary and to decide the case based oi i medical evidence
submitted at the hearing. Because there was medical evidence submitted that
supports the Administrative Law Judge's finding that the events leading up to
the surgery were not the legal or medical cause for the need for surgery,
CQunsel for the defendant maintains it was proper for the Administrative Law
Judge to rely on that evidence in denying benefits.
The Commission finds that the issues to be resolved on review are
whether legal and medical cause are established by the facts in the instant
case. This case presents the unique question regarding what amount of mental
stress will objectively be considered unusual exertion so as to establish
legal causation. This case also presents the difficult question of how to
decide medical causation where even the medical experts decline to pinpoint a
definitive cause for the internal failure. Many of the points made by counsel
for the applicant in the Motion for Review are not contested. The Commission
agrees pre-existing conditions aggravated by a work injury can be compensated
and the Commission agrees mental stress can be considered exertion.
The
issues involved here are whether the facts in this case show the mental stress
amounted to unusual exertion and whether the mental stress medically caused an
aggravation of the, arteriosclerotic cornoary
condition. Because the Allen
case significantly changed the elements of compensability with respect to
industrial injuries, just reviewing pre-Allen cases with similar facts is
insufficient for purposes of determining compensability in this case. The
Allen unusual exertion legal causation standard and the element of medical
causation are the key issues here.
In applying the unusual exertion legal causation standard, applicable
to this case due to the pre-existing arteriosclerotic heart disease, the
Commission must admit it is very difficult to determine what constitutes
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unusually exertive mental stress as compared to what the average person
encounters on a daily basis in non-employment life. The question becomes was
the applicant's busy schedule as a trial attorney more mentally stressful than
the average person's non-employment mental stresses of for example social
confrontations, financial problems and/or the stress of raising children.
This is a particularly perplexing problem and the Commission finds it
difficult to weigh one mental stress against another objectively. To resolve
the dilemma, the Commission must resort back to the language in Allen.
To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a
pre-existing
condition must show that the
employment
contributed something substantial to increase the risk he
already faced in everyday life because of his condition.
This additional element of risk in the work place is
usually
supplied
by
an
exertion
greater
than
that
undertaken in normal, everyday life. This extra exertion
serves to offset the pre-existing condition of the employee
as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims
for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than
exertions at work.
The Commission
finds the key language here is "contributed
something
substantial" to the risk already faced.
If the work place does contribute
something substantial, then legal cause is established.
So the question
becomes,
did
the applicant's
work
place
stress
contribute
something
substantial that increased the risk of heart failure that the applicant
already faced due to his pre-existing condition.
The question must be answered by viewing the medical evidence. Both
doctors who review the question of contribution of work stress find work
stress as one of a number of contributing factors to the risk of heart failure
the applicant faced.
The Administrative Law Judge chose to rely on Dr.
Perry's statement as follows;
The question of chronic job stress is a different issue. I
think that there was a much greater contribution to his
premature
coronary
artherosclerosis
from
his
heavy
cigarette smoking, his high cholesterolemia, and his facial
xanthoma, as well as his type-A hard-driving personality
than one could attribute to his job as an attorney.
Counsel for the applicant cites Dr. Null's statement as follows:
In my opinion, the emotional stress and tension related to
his occupation are certainly associated with an aggravation
to produce his mild myocardial infarction.
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Dt
Perry's statement looks to quantifying how substantial the work stress
factor was in comparison to the pre-existing factors. Dr. Null's does not.
Because the issue needing resolution, according to the above-cited language
from Allen, is whether the work contribution is substantial, the Commission
finds the Administrative Law Judge properly relied on the medical evidence
that best addresses the question of how substantial the work contribution
was.
Furthermore, just from a logical standpoint, where there are still 5
major risk factors present even in the absence of the work stress factor, it
would seem adding one more factor is not a substantial contribution.
The
Commission also finds that Dr. Null's opinion is not completely at odds with
that of Dr. Perry.
Dr. Perry merely elaborates more definitively in his
analysis. As such, the Commission finds it was not mandatory that a medical
panel be appointed to resolve a medical controversy as no true controversy is
evident.
The Commission
finds the Administrative Law Judge correctly
determined legal causation was not established as the work stress did not
contribute substantially tc the
i 13k of tieart failure.
Because legal
causation is not established, there is no need to review the issue regarding
medical causation. Based on the failure to establish one of the necessary
elements of compensability,
legal causation, the Commission finds the
Administrative Law Judge's denial of benefits should be affirmed.

ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's August 10, 198 7 Motion
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's June 22, 1987 Order is
hereby affirmed and fnnl with further appeal ID the Court of Appeal:* only
pursuant to u i; n

ID-J S

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Ut^Jt), Salt Lake^i^y, U£ah, this

day oi X/m^mtfA/

1987,

ATTEST:

__,—
Linda J . Sinrasburg
Commissio^i S e c r e t a r y

^ff
f
/
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
CASE No. 85000739
*
ROBERT M. MCRAE,

*
*

Applicant,
VS.
MCRAE & DELAND and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,
Defendants.

*

FINDINGS OF FACT

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*
*
*

AND ORDER

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on January 16,
1987, at 1:00 p.m.; same being pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard G. Sums ion, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented by Keith E.
Sohm, Attorney at Law.
The defendants were represented by Elliot K. Morris,
Attorney at Law.

The issues in this case are as follows:
1.

Was the stress of the applicant's employment as an
attorney on June 28-29, 1985, the cause of the heart
attack sustained at that time?

2.

Does the stress to which the applicant was subjected
on or before June 28, 1985, fulfill the requirements
of legal causation and medical causation as defined in
the recent case of Allen v. Industrial Commission?

3.

If so, what benefits is the applicant
under the Workers Compensation Act?
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F LNDEiMGG OF bACT:

1.
The applicant is a practicing trial attorney with offices LL
Vernal, Utah and Salt Lake City, Utah.
On June 28-29, 1985, the applicant
sustained a severe heart attack during the course of his employment.
The
diary or schedule kept by his secretary shows that on June 28, 1985, he was
scheduled for depositions in the morning, two trials in the Circuit Court, and
a meeting with a client in the oil fields. Forty-five minutes after lunch, he
had severe stomach pains prompting him to go to the Ashley Valley Medical
Center. He had blood drawn and underwent an EKG and was told a serum test
would be made. To his knowledge, he went to the oil field to meet with his
client.
Upon his return, he still didn't feel very good.
He had dinner
downtown, because his wife was in Salt Lake City. The hospital explained to
him the reason for the blood serum test. Apparently they suspected an ulcer
condition. He decided not to stay in the hospital, even though he had been
asked to do JO
The following morning, June 29, 1985, he returned to the
Ashley Valley Medical Center for a repeat blood test and another EKG. He then
went to his office, because he was scheduled to be involved in depositions.
2. The applicant proceeded with the depositions the morning of June
2'i, 1985, but around 11:00 a.m., Dr. Norman Nielsen called from the hospital
ar I informed the applicant he was having a heart attack and he was to ^ t t
the hospital immediately. He finished the deposition in which he was involved
and then sent his secretary home to get some clothes. He then drove three
blockJ to thin hospital. He was then sent by lifeline to Salt Lake City, where
he was admitted to the St. Mark's Hospital.
He recalls very little that
happened after that for a period of some fourteen days. He underwent a triple
bypass surgery on July 1, 1985
He was told Hiat he came very close to dying
on a couple of occasions.
He was released from the hospital on July 16,
1985. He returned to active practice around August 12, 1985, but on a limited
basis, avoiding cour:. appearances, and has continued to ao so to the present
time.
3.
The applicant has a long documented history of prior heart
disease, dating back fifteen years or so prior to the incident in question.
The risk factors contributing to his coronary atheroscerosis include heavy
cigarette smoking, high cholesterolemia, facial xanthoma, heavy drinker of
alcoholic beverages, type "A" personality, high blood pressure, and employment
as a hard-driving, self-employed attorney who has been engaged in heavy trial
work for morn than twenty five years
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4.
It is difficult to quantify the stress associated with the
applicant's particular practice of law. It is probably safe to assume that it
was a more stressful practice than engaged in by most attorneys, but there is
no indication that it was uniquely stressful.
Chronic job stress is
considered by cardiologists as one of the factors contributing to coronary
atheroscerosis. As with many of the stress factors, they usually do not have
an acute impact upon the development of the disease, but the long-term impact
appears to be borne out in numerous case histories.
5. The nurses' notes at the Ashley Valley Medical Center, recorded
on June 28, 1985, are significant. They indicate he was
"admitted with complaints of chest pain since Sunday.
He states that the pain comes and goes and also has
complaints of pain to both arms."
See Exhibit "D-l", p. 83. There is some dispute as to whether or not he
really complained of chest pains, or simply informed the nurse by pointing to
his chest and across his shoulders, and this was construed as a description of
chest pain.
6. The Administrative Law Judge acknowledges the use of such terms
as "heart attack" and "myocardial infarction" in this Order and in various
medical records is accurate only in the broadest sense of those terms. More
accurately, his condition is described as atherosclerotic heart disease and
pending myocardial infarction with findings consistent with severe coronary
insufficiency. Angiography performed on June 30th showed high grade stenosis
of the three arteries in which bypass surgery was performed. The applicant
had severe respiratory difficulties after surgery in addition to other
problems and he was in the intensive care unit much longer than is normally
the case.
7.
In dealing with the causation factors associated with the
applicant's heart attack, it is important to understand the conflict of
opinion that exists. Applicant's cardiologist, Dr. F. Clyde Null, offered the
following explanation in response to an inquiry from applicant's attorney:
"Atheroscerotic heart disease, of course, is exacerbated under symptoms of angina pectorus or made much worse
under periods of emotional stress, pressure and tension.
Prolonged hours of activity, striking degree of physical
exertion, exposure to cold, or marked emotional pressure
and tension frequently result in increased symptoms referable to the heart. Mr. McRae has underlying atherosclerotic heart disease, and of course, all of the symptoms of
that disorder can be made worse by heavy work loads and
excessive emotional pressure and tension."
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8
offered tht
adjuster:

Or
J Joseph Perry, who is also a specialist in cardiology,
iul lowing explanation in response to an inquiry from the insurance

"There was nu change in his job requirements, the
physical activity, number or hours worked, or stresses in
the months prior to his myocardial infarction, compared to
the years before this occurred.
Therefore, there is no
causal relationship of an acute nature with his myocardial
infarction.
The question of chronic job stress is a
different issue.
I think that there was a much greater
contribution to his premature coronary atherosclerosis from
his heavy cigarette smoking, his high cholesterolemia, and
his facial xanthoma, as well as his type-A, hard-driving
personality than one could attribute to his job as an
attorney "
(

J
Al im
considering the foregoing possible scenarios and the
importance of the role of stress, thp Administrative Law Judge finds no
convincing evidence of any unusual or acute stress with regard to the
applicant's work activities on the date of, or preceding, the onset of the
symptoms which led to hi'-, hospitalization and eventual bypass surgery. This
is not to say that he was not working under stressful circumstances. To the
contrary, as noted previously, the applicant's type and style of practice
could justifiably be characterized as more stressful than most attorneys. It
does not appear, however, as pointed out by Dr. Perry, that during the last
week of June, 1985 there was any significant change in his job requirements,
the level )f his physical activity, the number or hours worked, or the
stresses he had experienced in the months prior thereto.
It is also
significant to note that the history taken at the St. Mark's Hospital on June
29, 1985, on the date of his admission is as follows:
"This gentleman on 5-23-85 [6-23-85] noted the onset
of substernal epigastric pain following a day of rather
significant physical exertion that persisted for a short
period of time then remissed with no medication. On the
day following, as he awoke, he again noted the same
substernal pain persisting longer and more intense and
[than] at this time of the day previously.
His wife
checked his pulse and was aware that it was irregular. On
the day following the chest pain occurred and reoccurred
intermittently
with
recurring
episodes
J£
discomfort
substernal and attended by some element at shortness of
breath.
By Friday, the chest pain was intermittent,
severe, radiating to his neck and to his arms and to his
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wrists. This was occurring bilaterally, but more severe on
the left arm. He was seen in the emergency room at the
Ashley Valley Hospital.
An EKG was obtained that is
reported to have shown some T-wave inversion in 2, 3, and
AVF. Enczymes were said to be normal. However, because of
the chest pain persisting and because of the concern of the
doctors, he was called on Saturday, 6-29-85 for a revisit
to the emergency room, at which time the EKG changes were
more pronounced with definite T-wave inversion in 2, 3, and
AVF, but also an elevated CPK of 417 and a isoenczyme of 66
constituting a 15% range. Because of the EKG changes and
the enczyme changes, he was air-evacuated to St. Mark's
Hospital
for
evaluation
and
admission
for
further
diagnostic studies." (See Exhibit "D-l", p. 64).
For the foregoing reasons, the Administrative Law Judge finds the applicant
has failed to meet his burden of proof in showing the requirements of legal
causation or medical causation as set forth in the recent Utah Supreme Court
case of Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 25 (1986).
Footnote 9
referred to in the Allen decision is of particular significance when applied
to the facts of this case. It reads:
"Evidence of the ordinariness or unusualness of the
employee's
exertions may be relevant
to the medical
conclusion of causal connection. Where the injury results
• from latent symptoms with an illness such as heart disease,
proof of medical causation may be especially difficult.
Larsen's treatise cites many examples of cases where
compensation claims were defeated because of inadequate
proof of medical causation.
See Larson, supra, Para.
38.83(i) at 7-319 to -321. Compare Guidry v. Sline, Indus.
Pointers, Inc., 418 So.2d 626 (La. 1982) heart attack
triggered by stress, exertion, and strain greater than
sedentary life of average worker compensable.
Admittedly, there is case authority on both sides of the issue. But, as
applied to the facts of the instant case, the Administrative Law Judge finds
the analysis and opinion of Dr. Perry more accurately reflects the causative
factors leading to the applicant's hospitalization and bypass surgery, and the
Administrative Law Judge adopts Dr. Perry's opinion as his own. In doing so,
it should be noted that in analyzing the causative factors leading to heart
problems, the risk factors are generally well know. Isolating which of those
risk factors constitutes the actual cause appears to be an almost impossible
task, but a consideration of the factors does allow for a considered opinion
relative to the medical probabilities. The significance of this is emphasized
by the Supreme Court's recent decision in the case of Lancaster v. Gilbert
Development, filed April 20, 1987.
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CONCLUSIONS i I LAW

Only a portion nt the re Ievant evidence LS reflected in the foregoing
Findings of Fact, but ^uth is deemed sufficient to identify the issues and the
basis for the determination that the applicant has failed to meet his burden
of proof in establishing legal and medical causation. Accordingly, the claim
of the applicant must necessarily bo denied.

ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of the applicant be, and the
same is hereby, denied.
II Lo FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for revit^ o£ the toregoing
shall be filed In writing within fifteen (15) days J! the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Richard G. Sums ion-'
Administrative Law Ijd^e

Passea by the Industrial Commission
of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, this
rr ^g*MS-day of June, 1987.
ATTEST:

Linda J. Strasbourg
Commission S^iretary
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which denied the application.

On appeal,

the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Ferdinand Erickson, J., entered judgment in favor of the widow's claim and
the Retirement Board appealed.

The Su-

preme Court, Hyde, District Judge, held
that

record in hearing supported trial

court's conclusion that judge, who testimony showed suffered a deterioration of
health brought on by the stresses of highly
sensitive cases handled by him during the
last six weeks of his life, died as a result
of an accident arising out of or in the
course of his employment
Affirmed.
Crockett, J., did not participate.
1. Appeal and Error <$=>1008.1(1), 1012.1(4)
MTHUMMt JTSTtM

S>

Trial court's findings will not be disturbed unless clearly against weight of
evidence or unless it manifestly appears

503 P.2d 137

that court has misapplied law to the es-

Inga-LIU ELTON, Plaintiff and Respondent,

tablished facts.

v.
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, an
agency of the State of Utah, Defendant and Appellant
No. 12809.
Supremo Court of Utah.
Nov. 15, 1972.
Proceeding on application for widow's
benefits to the State Retirement Board

2. Judges C=22(ll)
Record in hearing on claim of widow
to the State Retirement Board for widow's
benefits supported trial court's conclusion
that judge, who testimony showed suffered
a deterioration of health brought on by
the stresses of highly sensitive cases handled by him during the last six weeks of
his life, died as a resulf of an accident aris-

6. State v. Davis, 121 Utah ISO, 210 P.2d 205.
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ing out of or in the course of his employment

U.CA.1953, 49-7-4.

K. Roger Bean, Asst. Atty. Gen., Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
for defendant and appellant.
Harold G. Christensen, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff and respondent.
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of judicial review that the trial court's
findings will not be disturbed unless they
arc clearly against the weight of the evidence or it manifestly appears the court
misapplied the law to the established facts.
Hardy v. Hendrickson, 17 Utah 2d 251, 495
P.2d 28.
The legal structure within which the
evidence is to be considered is the former
judicial retirement act which provided as
follows:

HYDE, District Judge:
Disability retirement compensation—
The plaintiff is the widow of the late
Judge Leonard Elton.

widow's pension.—Any judge who has

Judge Elton died

had 10 >ears of service and who is re-

May 13, 1970, as a result of a stroke.

tired on grounds of disability pursuant to

Plaintiffs application for widow's benefits

Section 49-7-£(d) shall be entitled to the

to the Utah State Retirement Board was

disability retirement compensation pio-

denied

Said administrative ruling was

vided for in this act.

Any judge, re-

appealed to the district court, which court

gardless of the years of service, whose

heard the case de novo and ruled in favor

disability arises out of or in the course

of the widow's claim and against the Utah

of performance of his judicial duties and

State Retirement Board.

the widow of every judge who is killed
by accident or arising out of or in the

[1] Appellant seeks reversal of the decision* of the district court on the basis that
Judge Elton died as a result of a disease
and not as a result of an accident in that
the evidence did not show some workrelated incident or accident, and further,
that Judge Elton's stroke did not arise out
of or occur in the course of his employment. The issue presented by this appeal
is therefore simply whether the findings of
the lower court are supported by competent evidence. It being a well settled rule
28 UUf 2d—24
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course of his employment, wheresoever
such injury occurred, shall be entitled to
the disability retirement compensation or
widows' pension, respectively, provided
for in this act.

[Section 49-7—1, U.CA.

1953.]
This court has previously determined
that aggravation of a pre-existing disease
by an industrial accident is compensable
and that an internal failure brought about
by exertion in the coure of emplo>ment

28 U T A H
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ma) be an accident within the meaning

work on the 23rd to hear motions on a case

of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act.

which had aroused extreme public interest.

Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah

He also worked April 24th, a holiday, hear-

2d 140, 427 P.2d 740 (1967).
Workmen's

Compensation

Act

The Utah

ing extensive arguments in the same case.

employs

On Monday, April 27th, Judge Elton was

language identical to that found in the

again home ill.

Judges Retirement Act above quoted.

the 28th, who insisted he stay home for a

The evidence at the trial shows that
Judge Leonard Elton was appointed to the
bench of the Third Judicial District in 1966.
At the time he was in good health; there
were no indications of ph\sical impairment. He was not then and had not for
many years been under medical care. On
January 9, 1969 Judge Elton suffered a
stroke. He was hospitalized for a time and
then returned to part-time emplo>ment.
By the fall of 1969 he had resumed his
judicial duties and was working full time.
On January 1, 1970 he assumed the responsibilities of presiding judge for the
Third Judicial District. These responsibilities substantially increased his work
load. As presiding judge he assigned to
himself several sensitive and difficult cases.
From the time he resumed his full judicial
duties until April 20, 1970 Judge Elton saw
his doctor monthly without complaint or
medical findings. On April 21, 1970 Judge
Elton consulted his doctor, complaining of
dizziness. He was clammy, unsteady in
gait, and had experienced nausea and
vomiting. I lis doctor believed he had suffered a stroke. He sta\ed home ill the
21st and 22nd of April. He rcfinied to

week.

He saw his doctor on

On Wednesday, May 6th, he had

returned to work carrying a full case load.
On May 12th he made his ruling on the
case which had aroused such public interest, started a nonjury case, and heard an
annulment and a divorce.

He had a jury

case scheduled for May 13th but died that
morning.
The persons who knew him best—his
wife, his colleagues, his clerk, his bailiff,
and the lawyers who practiced before him
—all testified to the deterioration of his
health, brought upon by the stresses of the
highly sensitive cases handled by him
during the last six weeks of his life. His
physician testified that Judge Elton suffered from vascular disease, resulting in
insufficient blood supply to the brain, and
that this condition was aggravated by the
stresses of Judge Elton's emplo>ment, and
that these stresses were the principal factor
in cutting i>hort his life.

under the tradition U rules of review the
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judgment of that court will not be disturbed. The judgment of the trial court
is affirmed, no costs awarded.
CALLISTER, C. J., and HEXRIOD,
T C C K E T T and ELLETT, JJ., concur.
CROCKETT,

J.,

having

disqualified

himself, does not participate herein.
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